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Non-technical summary
Using data from the 1997 and 2002 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel and from
official statistics, the present paper studies whether natives are less supportive of state
help for the unemployed in regions where the share of foreigners among the unemployed is
high. The effect of immigration or ethnic diversity in general on the political support for
the welfare state has received increasing attention in the last decade, both in academia
and in the political debate. Some authors have argued that a certain social cohesion is
not only the result of, but also a necessary condition for social policy and redistribution,
and that ethnic diversity weakens this social cohesion. Previous empirical studies have
given mixed results, however.
Unlike these previous studies, I use individual-level panel data, which allows a more con-
vincing identification of a causal effect. Also, the effect of immigration on support for
redistribution has not been studied for Germany—Europe’s largest country of immigra-
tion in terms of absolute numbers— before. Finally, similar to the influential study by
Luttmer (2001), I am able to relate the support for a particular aspect of the welfare state
(help for the unemployed) not just to the overall share of foreigners in the population,
but also to their share among the unemployed.
The main result is that there is indeed evidence that German natives’ support for the
unemployed is negatively affected by the regional share of foreigners among the unem-
ployed. This still holds when individual characteristics are controlled for, and also when
only the within variation is exploited, although in the latter case the estimates are not
always statistically significant at conventional levels. Concerning practical significance, I
find that a one standard deviation increase in the regional share of foreigners among the
unemployed reduces natives’ support for helping the unemployed by about two percent
of the standard deviation. This effect is rather small compared to other variables such as
income, self-employment, or East German origin.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze (German summary)
Der Einfluss der Einwanderung auf die politische Unterstützung für den Sozialstaat ist
in den vergangenen Jahren verstärkt zum Gegenstand der wissenschaftlichen und poli-
tischen Diskussion geworden. Eine zentrale These lautet, dass ein gewisser sozialer
Zusammenhalt nicht nur Folge, sondern auch Voraussetzung staatlicher Sozialpolitik und
Umverteilung ist, und dass eine zunehmende ethnische Vielfalt diesen sozialen Zusam-
menhalt möglicherweise schwächt. Die bisherigen empirischen Untersuchungen zu dieser
These kommen allerdings zu keinen eindeutigen Ergebnissen. Für Deutschland wurde der
Einfluss der Einwanderung auf die Umverteilungsbereitschaft der Bevölkerung überhaupt
noch noch nicht untersucht.
Die vorliegende Studie füllt diese Lücke. Sie untersucht, inwieweit die Einstellungen
deutscher Staatsangehöriger gegenüber der staatlichen Unterstützung von Arbeitslosen
vom regionalen Ausländeranteil unter den Arbeitslosen beeinflusst werden. Datenbasis
sind zwei Wellen des Sozio-ökonomischen Panels, die für die Zwecke der Untersuchung
mit Daten der amtlichen Statistik verknüpft wurden. Hierbei wird nicht der Ausländer-
anteil in der Bevölkerung, sondern der für die hier untersuchte Fragestellung relevantere
Anteil der Ausländer unter den Arbeitslosen berücksichtigt. Eine weitere, methodische
Verbesserung gegenüber bisherigen Studien ist die Verwendung von Paneldaten auf indi-
vidueller Ebene. Mit diesen Daten lässt sich ein kausaler Zusammenhang zwischen der
Einwanderung und der Umverteilungsbereitschaft unter schwächeren Annahmen identi-
fizieren.
Das zentrale Ergebnis der Studie lautet, dass ein negativer Zusammenhang zwischen dem
regionalen Ausländeranteil unter den Arbeitslosen und der Zustimmung von Nichtein-
wanderern zu staatlicher Unterstützung für die Arbeitslosen besteht. Dieser negative
Zusammenhang ist robust. Er zeigt sich auch dann, wenn andere individuelle und re-
gionale Einflussgrößen, die die Umverteilungspräferenzen der Bevölkerung beeinflussen,
kontrolliert werden. In Schätzungen, in denen der Einfluss von über die Zeit konstanten
unbeobachteten Faktoren ausgeschaltet wird, ist der negative Zusammenhang allerdings
nicht immer statistisch signifikant. Zudem erscheint der Einfluss der Ausländeranteils auf
die Einstellungen der Nichteinwanderer grundsätzlich eher schwach. Andere Determinan-
ten, wie etwa das Einkommen, eine Tätigkeit als Selbständiger oder eine Herkunft aus
Ostdeutschland, haben einen deutlich stärkeren Einfluss auf die Einstellung gegenüber
der staatlichen Unterstützung für die Arbeitslosen.
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1 Introduction
There is a large literature on the costs and benefits of immigration within a given system of
social security; interest in whether immigration may change this system of social security
in turn. For instance, Alesina et al. (2001) and Alesina and Glaeser (2004) argue that
one reason why the U.S. does not have a European-style welfare state is that the ethnic
diversity of the population is greater in the U.S. than in Europe. Likewise, in the debate
about a reform of the system of social security, some people have argued that what may
work in Denmark or other Nordic countries may not work in France or Germany where
the population is more heterogeneous. The idea behind this claim is that a certain social
cohesion is not only the result of, but also a necessary condition for social policy and
redistribution, and that ethnic diversity weakens this social cohesion.
In this paper I study attitudes towards a particular aspect of the welfare state: help
for the unemployed. I test the hypothesis that the higher the share of foreigners among
the unemployed, the less natives will be in favour of state responsibility for helping the
unemployed. The data are from two waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel, merged
with information from official statistics on the registered unemployed.
Earlier studies have given mixed results. Using data from the General Social Survey for
the years 1972 to 1993, Luttmer (2001) shows that in the U.S. people are more likely
to express support for welfare spending if they live in a neighborhood where the share
of people of their own race among welfare recipients is high. This is true whatever
the economic situation of the respondents, even among wealthy people who have only
a very small risk of being welfare recipients themselves. On the other hand, Alesina
et al. (2001), who also use data from the General Social Survey, find that support among
whites is not significantly associated with the share of blacks in the population of the
respondent’s state. Soroka et al. (2004) find for Canada that “the link [between regional
ethnic diversity and support for social programs] is weak at best” (p. 50); “moving from
100%majority to 50%majority leads to a decrease in aggregate support for unemployment
and welfare of about .0025%” (p. 51). Similarly, Senik, Stichnoth, and Van der Straeten
(2009), who use data from the European Social Survey, find that for Europe as a whole
there is only weak evidence of a negative association between the perceived presence
of immigrants and natives’ support for the welfare state. However, this weak average
relationship masks considerable heterogeneity across countries, and between individuals
with different attitudes towards immigrants.
The main contribution of the present paper is the use of individual-level panel data,
which allows identification of a causal effect under weaker assumptions. Also, the effect
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of immigration on support for redistribution has not been studied for Germany—Europe’s
largest country of immigration in terms of absolute numbers— before. Finally, similar to
Luttmer, I am able to relate support for a particular aspect of the welfare state (help for
the unemployed) not just to the overall share of foreigners in the population, but also to
their share among the unemployed.
Support for the welfare state is measured by two questions from the 1997 and 2002
waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). The questions ask about the
extent to which the state should be responsible for the financial security of the unem-
ployed and for job creation measures. (These are the same variables used by Alesina
and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) in their study on East-West differences in the support for
redistribution.) I merge these data with official statistics on the share of foreigners among
the (registered) unemployed at the level of federal states, regional planning units, and
counties. There is considerable variation in this share: in the state of Brandenburg in
1997, only 1% of the unemployed were foreigners; in Baden-Wuerttemberg (where overall
unemployment is much lower), the share was almost 24%.
Different mean comparisons and bivariate regressions show that there is indeed a negative
relationship between the regional share of foreigners among the unemployed and natives’
solidarity with the unemployed. However, individuals self-select into regions, and the
regional share of foreigners among the unemployed is therefore most likely endogenous.
In particular, people of East German origin tend to be more supportive of the welfare
state, and tend to live in regions with a low share of foreigners among the unemployed;
other important common influences are income and own unemployment status. As in
the previous studies, I attempt to control for such common influences by using multiple
regression. Moreover, the use of individual-level panel data also allows me to eliminate
all inconsistencies resulting from time-invariant unobserved factors.
The main result is that there is indeed evidence that German natives’ support for the
unemployed is negatively affected by the regional share of foreigners among the unem-
ployed. This still holds when individual characteristics are controlled for, and also when
only the within variation is exploited, although in the latter case the estimates are not
always statistically significant at conventional levels. Concerning practical significance, I
find that a one standard deviation increase in the regional share of foreigners among the
unemployed reduces natives’ support for helping the unemployed by about two percent
of the standard deviation. This effect is rather small compared to other variables such as
income, self-employment, or East German origin.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 motivates the empirical specifi-
cation by reviewing theoretical arguments and empirical studies on individual attitudes
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towards the welfare state. Section 3 presents the data; in section 4 I begin exploring the
data with simple mean comparisons. Section 5 then discusses issues of identification and
of statistical inference. Section 6 gives the main results. In section 7, a number of tests
are done to explore the robustness of the results. Section 8 concludes.
2 Theoretical considerations
In this section I motivate the empirical specification, and in particular the choice of control
variables, by briefly reviewing theoretical arguments and previous empirical findings on
the determinants of the support for redistribution.
2.1 Self-Interest
There is little doubt that people’s support for redistribution is partly motivated by ma-
terial self-interest and that, other things equal, people who expect to benefit materially
from redistribution tend to support it. The empirical studies cited below all confirm that
support for redistribution tends to be higher among people with low income.
But these studies also show that not everybody even in the lowest income decile favours
more redistribution; moreover, evidence on actual redistribution shows that countries
with a more inegalitarian distribution of income do not necessarily redistribute more.
These findings need not be inconsistent with material self-interest. One explanation
may be that today’s poor expect to be less poor and thus expect to be among the net
payers tomorrow (Bénabou and Ok 2001). Consistent with this hypothesis, Ravallion and
Lokshin (2000) and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005b) find that, holding current income
constant, people whose income has risen in the recent past or who expect to climb the
social ladder tend to be less supportive of redistribution.1
There are at least two other reasons why, to borrow Roemer (1998)’s expression, “the
poor do not expropriate the rich” even in democracies, although the income of the median
voter is less than the mean income. First, not even in democracies the actual amount
of redistribution is a function only of the demand for it. Especially in representative
democracies the outcome of the political process will depend, among other things, on
the activity of interest groups. But if the median income is below the mean income,
the “rich” are fewer in numbers than the “poor” and will therefore find it easier to
organize and to resist attempts to distribute income away from them (this argument goes
1Likewise, even today’s net payers may support state-organized redistribution as a form of insurance
against downward social mobility (e.g., Buchanan and Tullock 1962; Brennan 1973; Varian 1980).
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back to Olson (1965)’s classic study about the logic of collective action). Moreover, as
Roemer (1998) points out, people vote not only on redistribution but on a bundle of
policies. Lee and Roemer (2006) and Roemer and van der Straeten (2005, 2006) show
how anti-immigrant feelings—in combination with a voting system in which parties offer
a policy-bundle combining economic and non-economic issues—has reduced support for
the pro-redistribution party in elections in the United States, France, and Denmark.
Second, people likely take into account the distortions caused by taxation that shrink the
pie that could be shared. Piketty (1995, 1996a,b, 2003) finds that people who believe
that effort (as opposed to external circumstances) is important for economic success tend
to be less supportive of redistribution, arguably because the greater the importance of
effort in production, the greater the distortions caused by taxation.
2.2 Inter-dependent Preferences
As Fong (2001) argues, the negative correlation between the belief in the role of effort
and the support for redistribution can also stem from concerns about fairness: if people
believe that the just reward is proportional to one’s own effort and should be indepen-
dent of circumstances for which the individual is not responsible, then their support for
redistribution will be lower the greater their belief that one’s economic position depends
on one’s own effort.
The general idea is that the support for redistribution reflects not only self-interest but
also social preferences: most people care not only about their own absolute income, but
also about the income, consumption, or utility of other people (Hochman and Rodgers
1969), about the income distribution as a whole (Thurow 1971), or about the way the
distribution of income, consumption, or utility is arrived at. In the presence of cer-
tain inter-dependent preferences, redistribution may be Pareto-improving and even net
payers may support it.2 Note that this support may not (fully) translate into actual pri-
vate redistribution because of a free-rider problem; this is one argument for compulsory
redistribution by the state.
2.3 Social Distance
There is much evidence, both from observational and from experimental studies, that
altruistic behaviour depends on the situation and on the market and non-market char-
2Voluntary redistribution may also arise from self-interest, as Brennan (1973) points out. It may well
be that the net payers support redistribution not out of altruism but as a form of protection against
crime or civil unrest.
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acteristics of those involved.3 As Bowles and Gintis (2000, 45) put it, “reciprocity is
more salient, the less is the perceived social distance among the participants. ... Eco-
nomic inequality—particularly when overlaid with racial, ethnic, language, and other
differences—increases the social distance that then undermines the motivational basis for
reaching out to those in need.”
The idea that social distance affects the support for redistribution has been formalized by
Corneo and Grüner (2000) and tested by Corneo and Grüner (2000, 2002) and by Corneo
(2003). Using the difference in occupational prestige as a proxy for social distance, they
show that the greater the difference in average occupational prestige between one’s own
and the income class just below, the lower the support for redistribution. By contrast,
the greater the social distance to the income class just above one’s own, the greater the
support for redistribution. In their empirical studies an important part of the cross-
regional or cross-country variation in the support for redistribution remains unexplained,
however.
As already noted, the hypothesis of the present article is that this unexplained regional
variation in the support for redistribution partly results from the variation in the share
of immigrants among the beneficiaries of redistribution. The assumptions are that (A1)
support for redistribution is motivated both by self-interest and by altruism; (A2) altruism
is weaker the greater the perceived social distance between people, and (A3) other things
equal, the perceived social distance is greater between German nationals and immigrants
than within either category.4
Together, assumptions (A2) and (A3) imply that, other things equal, a German native will
feel less altruistic towards an immigrant than towards another German native. Adding
assumption (A1), the prediction is that other things equal, natives will be less supportive
of redistribution the higher the perceived share of immigrants among the perceived ben-
eficiaries of redistribution. The other things that have to be held equal are (1) material
self-interest of the respondent; (2) attributes of the beneficiaries of redistribution other
than their country of origin which may affect the respondent’s support for redistribution.
As in other observational studies, the present article attempts to hold these other things
equal by including control variables into a parametric model. Admittedly, this approach
only rarely leads to estimates of causal effects that are convincing by the standards of
modern microeconometrics. Recently, the literature has therefore complemented these
3This literature has been surveyed by Miller (1992), Alesina and La Ferrara (2005a), and Stichnoth
and Van der Straeten (2009).
4Models based on very similar assumptions have been formalized by Lind (2007) and by Senik et al.
(2009). Technically, these models posit that in an inter-dependent utility function, the weight that
person A attaches to person B’s income or utility decreases the greater the social distance between the
two persons. Usually, only two groups are considered, such as immigrants and natives.
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observational studies by experimental evidence (see the survey by Stichnoth and Van
der Straeten 2009). In these experiments, assignment to treatment and control groups is
random, and the characteristics of the respondents are subject to experimental control
(for instance, the proposer in a trust game is told only the ethnic identity of the receiver).
These experimental studies are therefore certainly the gold standard in terms of internal
validity, at the well-known cost in terms of external validity.
As far as observational studies on the effect of ethnic diversity on the support for redis-
tribution go, the present one is the first to use individual-level panel data, which allows
identification of a causal effect under weaker assumptions than in the previous studies by
Luttmer (2001), Alesina et al. (2001), Soroka et al. (2004), and Senik et al. (2009), which
all use cross-sectional data.
3 Data
I merge data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP) with data from official
statistics on the share of foreigners among the registered unemployed at three different
regional levels.
The GSOEP, which started in 1984, is a longitudinal survey of private households.5 I use
the waves of 1997 and 2002, in which social security was a special topic. I restrict the
sample to respondents with German nationality, which leaves me with 33203 person-year
observations. Of these, 2833 people participated in the 1997 wave only; 8399 people
participated in both waves, and 13572 people took part in the 2002 wave only. The
increase in sample size between 1997 and 2002 is due to the “Supplementary Sample E”
(1998), the “Innovation Sample F” (2000), and the “High-income Sample G” (2002).
The GSOEP contains regional identifiers at three different regional levels: counties, re-
gional planning units, and federal states. For reasons of data security, the analysis with
the identifiers at the levels of counties and regional planning units was done on-site at
DIW Berlin. I merged the GSOEP with regional information, in particular the share of
foreigners among the unemployed, that I obtained from the 1999 and 2004 editions of
the CD-ROM “Indikatoren und Karten zur Raumentwicklung,” (Indicators and Maps for
Regional Development) published by the Bundesamt für Bauwesen und Raumordnung
(Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning).6
5The data are available from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (GSOEP) at the German
Institute for Economic Research (DIW) in Berlin. See Wagner et al. (2007) for a detailed description of
the GSOEP.
6www.bbr.bund.de
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3.1 Dependent variable: attitudes towards state responsibility
for the unemployed
In 1997 and 2002, participants in the GSOEP were asked whether they wanted the state
or private forces to be responsible for helping the unemployed. The question ran: “At
present a multitude of social services are provided not only by the state but also by
private free-market enterprises, organizations, associations, or private citizens. What is
your opinion on this? Who should be responsible for the following areas: only the state,
mostly the state, state and private forces, mostly private forces, or only private forces?”
Eleven items follow, of which I use two: state responsibility for “financial security in case
of unemployment” and for “job creation measures”.7
As figures 1 and 2 (both reported in the appendix) show, most respondents are in favour
of some state responsibility for helping the unemployed. Support is higher for financial
security than for job creation measures.
These dependent variables are admittedly not ideal. The first problem is that I would
ideally like to measure natives’ altruism towards the unemployed, with the goal of testing
whether this altruism is lower the higher the share of immigrants among the unemployed.
However, while the dependent variables are certainly consistent with such an interpre-
tation and test, one cannot rule out an alternative interpretation, namely that natives’
support for state responsibility for the unemployment is affected by the share of immi-
grants among the unemployed because natives take a high share as an indication that
they themselves run a low risk of being unemployed themselves.
The second issue is that the two questions ask about the unemployed in general; as a
result, one cannot tell whether the respondents think about unemployment benefits or
unemployed assistance when they answer the question about the financial security of
the unemployed.8 One may worry that respondents may interpret the two dependent
variables as asking about whether unemployment insurance should be run by the state
7The nine other items are: “financial security of families”, “financial security in case of illness”,
“financial security for old age”, “financial security for persons needing care”, “caring for pre-schoolers”,
“caring for school children”, “care and help for the sick”, “care and help for the aged”, and “care and
help for persons needing care.”
8In Germany, unemployment benefits are called Arbeitslosengeld; these are the benefits paid by the
system of unemployment insurance. (However, even here the benefits are financed not only out of con-
tributions, but also out of general tax revenues). The second group are the unemployed who receive
unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfe), financed out of general taxes. Recipients of unemployment
assistance are mainly those people among the unemployed who were no longer entitled to receive unem-
ployment benefits. This was the system that was in place during the period of my study. More recently,
unemployment assistance has become much less generous and is now called Arbeitslosengeld II. The for-
mer Arbeitslosengeld has been renamed Arbeitslosengeld I, and the number of months during which it
can be received was considerably reduced.
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or by private companies.
A first argument in defence of the variables is that of the two dependent variables, only
one (financial security) is concerned by this problem. “Job creation measures” have no
connotation with an insurance system. Accordingly, more people are in favour of private
forces when they are asked about job creation measures (cf. figure 2 in the appendix).
Nevertheless, for “financial security” the issue definitely needs discussion. It is certainly
true that there are good reasons (spreading the risk over as many people as possible;
adverse selection) why insurance against unemployed is provided by the state and not by
private companies. In fact, to my knowledge the possibility of a private insurance against
unemployment has never been evoked in the German debate; the debate is always about
questions such as the duration and amount of benefits, and about the conditions for re-
ceiving these benefits (e.g., the intensity of job search efforts). However, precisely because
it is almost universally recognized that private companies have no role in unemployment
insurance, I propose the interpretation that the respondents take the question to be
mainly as being about unemployment assistance and/or the generosity of unemployment
insurance (e.g., the replacement ratio). After all, if the question were interpreted as be-
ing only about who should provide unemployment insurance, then one would expect that
almost everybody answers “only the state”. What we observe, however, is a distribution
that is roughly symmetric around the modal category “mostly the state” (if one discards
the two lowest categories). So the interpretation that I propose is that the question is
seen not so much as a choice between the state and private insurance companies, but
as between the state and private forces in the sense that the unemployed should be re-
sponsible for themselves. This interpretation becomes clearer in the original, German
version of the questionnaire. The question asks whether “der einzelne Bürger” should be
responsible, which means individual responsibility. The expression “private citizens” in
the English version of the questionnaire is misleading because it could also mean that
other people should be responsible for helping the unemployed. (Note that this English
version is only provided to the scientific community; respondents receive the German
version of the questionnaire.)
However, there are at least two counterarguments. First, the wording of the question
asks explicitly about who should be responsible, and does not mention generosity. Also,
as noted, the low percentage of people in the two lowest categories is worrysome. If the
question were interpreted as being only about generosity, then it is to be expected that
some people would show themselves as being very ungenerous towards the unemployed:
people who think that everybody can find a job if he or she really wants to etc. The low
number of respondents in these categories therefore does suggest that at least some people
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take the question as being about the state versus private insurance companies. After
all, the question asks not only about “der einzelne Bürger” (individual responsibility),
but also about “marktwirtschaftliche Unternehmen, Organisationen, Verbände” (private
companies, organizations, associations).
In conclusion, then, the dependent variables are not without their problems, but do seem
like a reasonable compromise, bearing in mind that there are no better alternatives in
the GSOEP. The fact that Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) use the same question (in
fact, all eleven items, not just the two that ask about the unemployed) for a very similar
purpose lends further support to their use in the present study.
3.2 Regressor of interest: regional variation in the share of for-
eigners among the unemployed
The regressor of interest is the share of foreigners among the registered unemployed in the
respondent’s region. This variable is available on a yearly basis from official statistics for
three regional levels: the 16 federal states, 97 regional planning units, and 437 counties
in Germany.
That I use the share of foreigners among the unemployed and not the share of immigrants
(perhaps even including the second generation) is dictated by data availability: official
statistics report only the share of foreigners among the unemployed and not the share of
immigrants. Given that I therefore have to make do with nationality when measuring the
share of the out-group among the unemployed, I choose to also distinguish respondents
in the GSOEP by nationality. (The results change little when country of birth is used
instead.)
As table 2 (which pools the data for 1997 and 2002) shows, the share of foreigners among
the unemployed is higher than their share in the population and exhibits considerable
regional variation. This regional variation is shown graphically in figure 3, which shows
the unemployment rate, the share of foreigners in the population and among the unem-
ployed for the sixteen federal states.9 In the Eastern state of Brandenburg in 1997, 1%
of the registered unemployed were foreigners; in Baden-Wuerttemberg in the same year,
their share was 23.9%. At the two more disaggregated levels of regions and counties, the
variation is of course even greater.
The empirical strategy, described in section 5 below, will consist in using only the vari-
ation within individuals between 1997 and 2002. The cross-sectional variation between
9Rheinland-Pfalz and Saarland have been grouped together since these two states form a single cate-
gory in the GSOEP.
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individuals is considered contaminated by unobserved individual characteristics, which
are assumed to be time-invariant. After the within transformation, these unobserved
time-invariant individual characteristics will be eliminated from the estimating equation.
Throwing away variation will reduce the precision of the estimates. It is therefore in-
structive to decompose the overall variation into variation within and variation between
individuals. The precision of the within-estimator will depend on how much variation is
left after discarding the variation between individuals.
The total variation of a variable xit around its mean x¯ can be decomposed as
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
(xit − x¯)2 =
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
[(xit − x¯i) + (x¯i − x¯)]2 (1)
=
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
(xit − x¯i)2 +
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
(x¯i − x¯)2 (2)
where x¯i is the mean of xit for individual i (see, e.g, Cameron and Trivedi 2005, 709).
Table 4 shows that using only within variation comes at a large cost in terms of variation:
only between 1.2 percent (federal states) and 4.5 percent (counties) of the overall variation
is within variation.
Part of this low within variation can be explained by the unbalanced nature of the panel.
As noted above, only 8399 people have valid information on the share of foreigners among
the unemployed in both waves. This means that only (2∗8399)/33203 ≈ .51 of the sample
can be used for the within estimator. When only the observations from the balanced panel
are used, the share of within variation is almost twice as high (see table 5). However,
the share is still at most 9 percent; this low figure reflects the high persistence of the
share of the foreigners among the unemployed, and the rather low geographical mobility
in Germany, compared to, say, the U.S.
3.3 Control variables
The GSOEP allows to control for a number of variables that influence both a person’s
support for the welfare state and his place of residence and hence the regional share of
foreigners among the unemployed.
I control for the respondent’s gender, labour force status, income, education, age, mar-
ital status, and household composition. Socialization in East Germany is proxied by a
dummy variable that indicates whether the respondent lived in West or East Germany in
1989. Table 3 in the appendix reports summary statistics for the individual-level control
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variables.
In addition to these individual characteristics, in some specifications I control for the
area’s unemployment rate and for the share of foreigners in the population (as opposed
to their share among the registered unemployed). Finally, I include a year dummy in the
model to allow the overall support for redistribution to differ between 1997 and 2002.
Table 6 (in the appendix) shows that mean values of these control variables differ between
respondents who support state responsibility for the unemployed and respondents who
favour private responsibility. People who are for state responsibility tend to be dispro-
portionately East German (defined either by residence in 1989 or by current residence).
Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007) have shown that this holds true even controlling for
other factors. Moreover, and consistent with theories that point to material self-interest
as a determinant of support for the welfare state, the table shows that people who favour
state responsibility for the unemployed are twice as likely to be unemployed themselves;
that they tend to have a lower household income, and that they are less likely to have a
secondary degree (Abitur) or a college degree.10 By contrast, the table shows that there
is little difference with respect to sex or marital status.
4 Mean comparisons
I begin the analysis by exploring the bivariate association between the share of foreign-
ers among the unemployed and natives’ support for redistribution. Table 7 shows that
German nationals who support state responsibility for the financial security of the un-
employed tend to live in regions with a lower share of foreigners among the unemployed.
This is true for all three regions: federal states, regional planning units, and counties.
As the last column of the table shows, the differences are highly statistically significant.
The table shows these statistics only for the dependent variable “financial security of the
unemployed”; similar results are obtained for the other dependent variable “job creation”.
In table 8 the bivariate relationship between the share of foreigners among the unemployed
and the support for redistribution is shown from a slightly different angle. The table
shows that mean support for helping the unemployed is lower in regions where the share
of foreigners among the unemployed is above the median. This holds for all three regions
and for all three variables used to measure the support for redistribution. (Each panel of
10These mean differences are highly statistically significant. The last column of the table shows p-values
from t-tests for the statistical significance of the difference of the means between the two categories. For
each variable, the assumption of equal variances has been tested using Bartlett’s χ2. If the assumption
is rejected, the t-test is conducted with an adjustment for unequal variances.
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the table corresponds to a region; within each panel, each line corresponds to a different
dependent variable).
However, given that people self-select into regions, there are likely to be third factors
that influence both the support of redistribution and the share of foreigners among the
unemployed in the respondent’s region. It has already been pointed out above (and docu-
mented in table 6) that people who support state responsibility for the unemployed tend
to be poorer, disproportionately often from East Germany, and that they have a higher
probability of being unemployed themselves. Table 9 shows that some of these variables
also predict whether a respondent lives in a county with a high or low share of foreigners
among the unemployed.11 For instance, among people who live in counties with a low
share of foreigners among the unemployed, East Germans (defined by residence in 1989
or by current residence) are overrepresented. Moreover, people in counties with a low
share tend to have lower household income and are more likely to be unemployed. As
noted, all these factors are also positively correlated with the support for the state helping
the unemployed, and will therefore at least partly drive the negative bivariate relation-
ship between the share of foreigners among the unemployed and support for helping the
unemployed.
5 Specification
So far, I have documented that there is a negative association between the share of im-
migrants among the unemployed and natives’ support for state help for the unemployed.
However, there is also evidence that this negative bivariate association may be driven
by third variables such as material self-interest (income, own unemployment) or by a
socialization in East Germany. In this section I therefore attempt to control for third
factors in a multivariate model.
The basic specification derives from the theoretical considerations of section 2. The
support of native i in area k in year t is modelled as
Supportikt = x′iktβ + αi + εikt (3)
Supportikt measures support for state help for the unemployed. The regressor of interest
in xikt is ShareForeignkt, the share of foreigners among the registered unemployed in
area k. In addition, xikt contains a number of control variables. As noted in section 3,
11The table shows these associations at the level of counties; results are similar at the levels of regions
and federal states.
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I control both for individual and for area-level characteristics. Depending on the model,
the area subscript k indexes counties, regional planning units, or federal states.
Note that the slope coefficients are assumed to be fixed and identical across observations.
By contrast, the intercept αi is a random variable that captures unobserved heterogeneity
between individuals.
5.1 Identification
I assume that the idiosyncratic error is strictly exogenous:
IE(εikt | αi,xik1,xik2) = 0 t = 1, 2 (4)
Strict exogeneity assumes that all time-varying unobserved effects have zero mean condi-
tional not only on current, but also on past and future values of the regressors. In other
words, I assume that all unobserved variables that are correlated with the regressors are
time-invariant and are therefore captured by αi.
Admittedly, the assumption of strict exogeneity is quite strong. The only defense is
that is is less strong than in previous studies on the effect of ethnic diversity on the
support for redistribution. These earlier studies use repeated cross-sections and therefore
include both time-varying and time-invariant unobserved effects in the error term εikt.
Because the present study uses panel data, at least the time-invariant unobserved effects
are eliminated as a source of inconsistency. Of course, it would be highly desirable to find
valid external instruments for the share of foreigners among the registered unemployed
in a region.
Under strict exogeneity, the conditional mean of Supportikt is given by
IE(Supportikt | xikt) = IE(αi | xikt) + x′iktβ (5)
The main modelling decision concerns the relation between the regressors and the unob-
served, time-invariant individual-specific effect αi. It seems likely that despite the inclu-
sion of a standard set of control variables, there are still some unobserved time-invariant,
individual-specific factors that affect both ShareForeignikt and the support for helping
the unemployed. Hence, it is likely that IE(αi | xikt) 6= 0; under this assumption, pooled
OLS or random effect estimators will be inconsistent. However, the time-invariant un-
observed effect αi can be eliminated through a within-transformation that expresses all
variables as deviations from their individual means. This within estimator is consistent
under the (weaker) assumption that all unobserved heterogeneity is time-invariant.
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The possibility of these transformations that eliminate αi explains why I choose to esti-
mate a linear model, even though the dependent variables that I use are categorical (with
five answer categories). This modelling decision is popular in applied microeconometrics;
it is generally believed that a linear fixed-effects model is superior to a non-linear random
effects model in applications like the present one (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frĳters (2004)
make a similar case concerning studies on the determinants of life satisfaction).
5.2 Statistical inference
5.2.1 Heteroskedasticity and serial correlation
With panel data, the unobserved time-varying components in different time periods are
likely to be correlated for the same individual. Moreover, the error terms are likely to
be heteroskedastic. For both reasons, inference should not be based on the assumption
of independent and identically distributed errors, but rather on a panel-robust estimate
of the asymptotic variance matrix, which takes into account both heteroskedasticity and
between-period correlation of error terms for the same individual. The panel-robust
estimator is given as
Vˆoneway(βˆ) =
[
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
w˜itw˜′it
]−1 N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
T∑
s=1
w˜itw˜′isuˆituˆis
[
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
w˜itw˜′it
]−1
(6)
where uˆit is the residual for individual i in period t, w˜it = (1 x′1it) for pooled OLS and
w˜it = (x1it − x¯i) for the within estimator. x1ikt contains all time-varying regressors that
appear in xikt. (See, for instance, Arellano 1987; Cameron and Trivedi 2005).
5.2.2 Clustering at the area-level
The variance estimator of equation (6) allows for “one-way” clustering: it allows for
correlation in the unobserved factors between the same individual in different periods,
but assumes that the unobserved factors are uncorrelated across individuals. However,
since I include area-level covariates, measurement error will introduce correlation in the
error terms of different individuals living in the same area.
In cross-sectional data, clustering is easily dealt with by applying the expression of equa-
tion (6): the only difference is that one sums over observations for different individuals
in each cluster, instead of summing over different time periods for each individual.
However, in this paper the issue is more complicated because both serial correlation and
the correlation within an area should be taken into account. To accomplish this, I use the
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variance estimator that was proposed recently by Thompson (2006) and Cameron et al.
(2006): they show that the variance estimator which allows for clustering at both the
individual and the area level is equal to the variance estimator that allows for individual-
level clustering, plus the variance estimator that allows for area-level clustering, minus
White (1980)’s heteroskedasticity-robust covariance estimator, which assumes indepen-
dent errors:12
Vˆtwoway(βˆ) = Vˆoneway,time + Vˆoneway, area − Vˆhet. robust (7)
where the expressions for the two oneway-cluster variance estimators are given by equa-
tion (6), and where
Vˆhet. robust(βˆ) =
[
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
w˜itw˜′it
]−1 N∑
i=1
T∑
i=1
uˆ2itw˜itw˜′it
[
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
w˜itw˜′it
]−1
(8)
6 Results
This section presents results for a number of models, which are all variants of equation (3).
There are six basic combinations: two different dependent variables (financial support
for the unemployed and job creation measures) and three regional levels at which the
share of foreigners among the unemployed is measured (counties, regional planning units,
federal states). For each of these combinations, the set of covariates is gradually built up:
I begin with a bivariate model and then include a growing number of individual controls.
Finally, aggregate-level controls will be added as well; these results are presented in
section 7 below.
To avoid losing track given this large number of variants, I present only the estimated
coefficients for the share of foreigners among the unemployed in this section; coefficient
estimates for the control variables can be found in the appendix. Moreover, I show results
only for the bivariate regression and then for a model with the full set of controls here;
the gradual built-up of the specification is also documented in the appendix.
Table 1 shows estimated coefficients for the regressor of interest when the dependent
variable is the support for financial security of the unemployed. The first two columns
of the table correspond to a bivariate model; columns 3 and 4 are for a model with the
full set of individual controls. Intermediate specifications, in which only subsets of the
individual controls are included, are shown in tables 10, 11, 12 (random effects) and 13,
14, 15 (fixed effects) in the appendix. These tables also report estimated coefficients for
12Thompson (2006) considers the case of two-way clustering in the linear model; Cameron et al. (2006)
consider the general case of multi-way clustering, in both linear and non-linear models.
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Table 1: Overview of results for the dependent variable ’state responsibility for the finan-
cial security for the unemployed’
Bivariate Full controls
RE FE RE FE
County -.0089* -.0043 -.0018* -.004
( .00054) ( .0022) ( .0007) ( .0023)
Regional planning unit -.011* -.008* -.0018* -.0069
( .00059) ( .004) ( .00086) ( .0042)
Federal state -.014* -.0089 -.0023* -.0045
( .00063) ( .0049) ( .0011) ( .0054)
Note: Asymptotic standard errors—robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation—are
shown in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
the control variables.
The standard errors in the table are robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation.
Note that I do not yet use the variance estimator that allows for two-way clustering here,
because the expression for Vˆoneway, area in equation (7) assumes that an individual is part
of exactly one area cluster. Since some people change their area of residence, this does
not hold for everybody in the sample. In subsection 7.2 below I will therefore restrict
the sample to people who stay in the same area, in order to use the variance estimator
of equation (7).
6.1 Random effects
The results for the random effects models are shown in columns 1 and 3 of table 1, and
in tables 10, 11, and 12.
Sign and statistical significance At all three geographical levels, there is evidence
of a negative bivariate relationship. The coefficient estimates are -0.0089 when the share
of foreigners is measured at the county level, -0.011 when it is measured at the level of
regional planning units, and -0.014 when it is measured at the level of federal states. All
three estimates are highly statistically significant.
Columns (2) to (5) of tables 10, 11, and 12 show that the coefficients are reduced in
absolute magnitude as further controls are added. As expected from the discussion of
the bivariate associations in section 3, the biggest reductions occur once income and East
German origin are added as controls. As noted, natives who live in areas with a high
share of foreigners among the unemployed tend to have a lower income; at the same
time, people with low income tend to support help for the unemployed, arguably out of
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material self-interest (because they have fewer own resources on which to fall back during
a spell of unemployment, and a higher risk of becoming unemployed in the first place).
East German residence (in 1989 or in the current periods of 1997 and 2002) is associated
with a low share of foreigners among the unemployed; at the same time, the table shows
that East Germans tend to be more supportive of state help for the unemployed, even
controlling for material self-interest.13
However, the principal result is that the marginal effect of a change in the share of
foreigners among the unemployed in a region on the support for state help for the unem-
ployed remains negative and significantly different from zero even after these individual
characteristics are controlled for.
Size of the coefficients With full individual controls, the estimated coefficients in the
random-effects model are -0.0018 for counties and regions, and -0.0023 for federal states.
To put these estimates into perspective, table 2 shows that the mean share of foreigners
among the unemployed is slightly above 13%. Typical regions in this respect are Os-
nabrück with a share of 13.3% or Siegen with a share of 13.5%. The standard deviation is
about 9 percentage points for regional planning units. Shares of around 13%+9% = 22%
are observed in regions such as Düsseldorf or Franken; shares of around 13%− 9% = 4%
are observed in the South-West of Schleswig-Holstein or Western Saxony.
A one standard deviation increase in the share of foreigners among the unemployed (e.g.,
the difference between Osnabrück and Düsseldorf) is thus associated with a reduction in
support of around 9 · (−0.0018) = −0.0162, once observed individual characteristics are
controlled for.
The dependent variable “financial support” has a mean of 3.9 and a standard deviation
of 0.8. That is, a one standard deviation increase in the share of foreigners among
the unemployed is associated with a reduction in support for financially helping the
unemployed of about two percent of the standard deviation of the dependent variable
(0.0162/0.8 ≈ 0.02). This is a very small effect when compared to the influence of
variables such as East German origin or household income. As column 5 of table 11
shows, people of East German origin tend to be more supportive by 0.2 points, more
than ten times the difference associated with a one standard deviation increase in the
13In this respect, the present paper is a partial replication study of Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln
(2007)’s article, and confirms their main results concerning the variables related to state help for the
unemployed. The replication is only partial because Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln use a wider set of
dependent variables. By contrast, and as noted above, I focus on support for the unemployed because
this is the measure of support for the welfare state that corresponds directly to the regressor of interest,
namely the share of foreigners among the unemployed.
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share of foreigners among the unemployed.
Results for control variables Concerning the other control variables, I find that the
findings from the mean comparisons of section 4 survive in the multivariate regression
models. In the random-effects models, people with high income or high wealth (proxied
for by home ownership) tend to be less supportive of state help for the unemployed. For a
given household income, support increases with household size. People who are currently
unemployed themselves tend to be more supportive. The self-employed tend to be much
less supportive. Even controlling for other factors, people with a secondary school degree
(Abitur) tend to be less supportive. Women tend to be more supportive than men.
Evidence on the relationship between expected future income and the support for re-
distribution comes from two questions about people’s economic concerns. Since I hold
current income constant, these questions are supposed to measure people’s expectations
about whether they may personally benefit from the welfare state in the future; that is,
the questions still proxy for material self-interest, but the self-interest is less myopic than
in the case of current income. Consistent with Bénabou and Ok (2001)’s “POUM hypoth-
esis” (probability of upward mobility), I find that people who are concerned about their
own financial situation and about the economy as a whole tend to be more supportive of
redistribution.
6.2 Fixed effects
The advantage of this article over previous studies is that I use panel data; by using
only the “within” variation, I can therefore eliminate all inconsistency stemming from
time-invariant omitted variables.
However, the price to pay for discarding the potentially contaminated “between” variation
is that the precision of the estimates will be reduced. As shown in section 3, in the
unbalanced panel only 4.8 percent of the overall variation is within variation in the
present application. This low figure reflects the high persistence of the share of the
foreigners among the unemployed, and the rather low geographical mobility in Germany,
compared to, say, the U.S. As a result, while the data used in the present article offer
an advantage in principal, the actual benefit is modest given the small within variation
that are observed with only two waves.14 The low within variation shows up in the fixed
14In future work I plan to go back to the GSOEP waves of 1987, 1992, and 1997, which contain a
general question on whether the state should be responsible for social security. However, compared to
the variables used in the present version of this article, the general question of the three earlier waves
has the drawback that it does not specifically ask about support for the unemployed. The link with the
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effects estimates, which are shown in columns 2 and 4 of table 1, and in tables 13, 14,
and 15 in the appendix.
The point estimates for the effect of the share of foreigners among the unemployed on
German nationals’ support for helping the unemployed are again negative for all three
regional levels.
Concerning statistical significance, I find that the coefficients for the model with full
individual controls are insignificant at conventional levels for federal states and regional
planning units: the estimated coefficients are -0.0069 (SE: 0.004) and -0.0045 (SE: 0.005),
respectively. At the level of counties, the estimated coefficient of -0.004 is weakly signif-
icant (SE: 0.0023). Its point estimates is almost twice as large in absolute value as for
the random effects model (-0.004 versus -0.0018). However, as discussed above, even this
larger coefficient is small compared to the coefficients for income or education.15
6.3 Hausman tests
Following Hausman (1978), I test whether the coefficient estimates on the time-varying re-
gressors obtained using the within-estimator are significantly different from the estimated
obtained with the random-effects estimator. However, the random effects estimator is not
fully efficient if the error term is not iid; as a result, the simplified test statistic of the
Hausman test, in which only the difference of two variance estimators enters the expres-
sion, cannot be used. Instead, one needs the more complicated expression for the variance
of the difference between the estimators (see Cameron and Trivedi 2005, 718).
As a way to avoid calculating this variance of the difference, Wooldridge (2002) proposes
to do a Wald test with panel-robust standard errors of γ = 0 in the auxiliary regression16
yit − λˆy¯i = 1− λˆ+ (x1it − λˆx¯1i)′β1 + (x1it − x¯1i)′γ + νit (9)
share of foreigners among the unemployed is therefore weaker.
15Generally, tables 13, 14, and 15 show that in the fixed-effects models the coefficients on the control
variables tend to have the same signs as in the random effects model, but due to the smaller variation,
many of the coefficients are no longer statistically significant. Coefficients on time-invariant regressors
such as sex or East German origin are not identified at all, of course.
16A caveat: for the case where the random-effects estimator is fully efficient, Hausman (1978) shows
that this auxiliary regression is asymptotically equivalent to the original Hausman test. However, when
the RE estimator is not fully efficient, as in the present application, it is not clear that the two tests
coincide (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, 719).
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where x1it contains only the time-varying regressors, yit is short for Supportit, and where
λˆ = 1− σˆε√
σˆ2ε + T σˆ2α
(10)
Here, σ2ε is the variance of the idiosyncratic error, and σ2α is the variance of the unobserved
individual effects. T , the number of time periods, is equal to 2.
Table 16 in the appendix shows the test statistics and p-values for a Wald test of γ = 0,
for each of the three regional levels. Only test results for the model with full individual
controls are shown; the test results for the intermediate models (with only subsets of the
individual controls) give similar results. The first line in each cell shows the test statistic,
the second line shows the associated p-value. An asterisk denotes statistical significance
at the 5% level. As noted, the test statistic is based on panel-robust standard errors17
I find that in all but one case the test rejects the null hypothesis that time-varying
parameters are the same for the random effects estimator and the within estimator.
In conclusion, then, the tests show that the random effects estimates are likely to be
inconsistent. At the same time, the fixed effects estimates—which are consistent under the
assumption that all unobserved heterogeneity is captured by a time-invariant intercept—
are rather imprecisely estimated because only a very small part of overall variation is
within variation. In fact, for almost all models of tables 1, the fixed effects estimates
are not significantly different from zero. Concerning practical significance, it has been
shown above that the random effects estimates suggest a rather weak influence of the
share of foreigners among the unemployed on German nationals’ support for helping the
unemployed. The same conclusion holds for the fixed-effects estimates. For the level of
federal states, the model with full individual controls estimates the lower bound of the 95%
confidence interval to be roughly −0.0045−2·0.005 = −.0145; for regional planning units,
this lower bound is very similar at about −0.0069− 2 · 0.004 = −.0149. For counties, the
association is even weaker, with a lower bound of approximately−0.004−2·0.002 = −.008.
As column 5 of tables 13, 14, and 15 show, even these lower bounds are small (in absolute
values) compared to the influence of other variables such as education: for instance, the
point estimate for the dummy Abitur (secondary school degree) is -0.17 for counties, -0.2
for regional planning units, and -0.16 for federal states.
17From a practical point of view, panel-robust inference means that Stata’s built-in hausman command
cannot be used. The auxiliary regression and the Wald tests have to be implemented “by hand”.
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7 Robustness checks
In this section I report results for four robustness checks: I use a different dependent
variable (section 7.1), restrict the sample to people who lived in the same area in 1997
and 2002 (section 7.2), and explore observed parameter heterogeneity by re-estimating
the models for different geographical subsamples (section 7.3). Finally, I discuss the
effects of introducing further area-level controls (section 7.4).
7.1 A different dependent variable: job creation
So far, all results have been obtained for the dependent variable that asks whether the
state should be responsible for the financial security of the unemployed. Table 17 in the
appendix shows estimation results for the same models as in table 1, but for a different
dependent variable.18 The variable measures whether respondents think that the state
should be responsible for job creation measures.
The basic results are unchanged: there is evidence of a negative relationship between the
share of foreigners among the unemployed and German nationals’ support for helping
the unemployed, but the practical significance of the estimated coefficients is again small
compared to other variables such as income or East German origin. In the fixed effects
models, the coefficients are never significantly different from zero. Finally, table 16 shows
that, as for the variable “financial security for the unemployed”, Hausman tests reject
the null hypothesis of equal parameters in the random effects and fixed effects models
also for the variable “job creation”.
7.2 Two-way clustering
So far, I have reported standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity and to serial
correlation in the idiosyncratic component of the error term. However, I have not yet
used the variance estimator that allows for two-way clustering, because the expression for
Vˆoneway, area in equation (7) assumes that an individual is part of exactly one area cluster.
Since some people change their area of residence between 1997 and 2002, this does not
hold for everybody in the sample.
I now restrict the sample to people who stay in the same area, in order to use the variance
estimator of equation (7). There are 8074 people in the sample for which information on
18Due to space constraints, only the coefficients of main interest are reported for this dependent
variable. The results for the control variables are available from the author upon request.
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the county of residence are available in both periods; for regional planning units and for
federal states, the numbers are 5329 and 8399, respectively. 8056 (96 percent) of these
live in the same federal state in 1997 and 2002; 4799 (90 percent) live in the same regional
planning unit, and 5191 (64 percent) live in the same county.19
This means that the within-variation is further reduced: now all within-variation comes
from changes in the share of foreigners among the unemployed in a given region. The
advantage is that time-invariant characteristics of the area, which influence both the
support for redistribution and the share of foreigners among the unemployed, no longer
render the estimator inconsistent. Above, only time-invariant characteristics of the indi-
viduals were eliminated from the models by the within-transformation.
The disadvantage is a further loss in the precision of the estimates. In fact, the share of
foreigners among the unemployed in an area is highly persistent: the correlation between
the share in 1997 and the share in 2002 is 0.9962 for federal states, 0.9926 for regional
planning units, and 0.8540 for counties.
Finally, people who stay in the same area are likely to be a non-random sub-sample of
all people in the GSOEP, even conditional on observable differences. One cannot rule
out that unobserved factors that lead people to move are correlated with the share of
foreigners among the unemployed. Inference is therefore with respect to the population
of “stayers” only, and not with respect to the whole population of German nationals as
in the tables above.
Tables 18 and 19 show the results when the model is estimated on this sample of “stayers”.
The standard errors reported in the tables are now robust not only to heteroskedastic-
ity and serial correlation, but also to contemporaneous correlation between individuals
living in the same period; as noted, this correlation would arise from measurement error
in the area-level variables or from unobserved area-level influences on the support for
redistribution. (As expected, these standard errors are considerably larger than in table
1, which contains both stayers and movers and which assumes that the unobserved terms
are uncorrelated across individuals even within an area.) The association between the
share of foreigners among the unemployed and natives’ support for redistribution is again
found to be negative, even controlling for a host of individual characteristics. Moreover,
by restricting the sample to people who live in the same area in 1997 and 2002, omit-
ted variables bias from unobserved characteristics of the area can also be ruled out, at
least as long as these characteristics and their influence were the same in the two years.
However, although the coefficients are larger in size than for the entire sample, for most
19Some of these people may have lived in other areas between 1997 and 2002; here, only the information
on where the people are observed in 1997 and 2002 is used.
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variants of the model the association is still rather weak compared to that observed for
other variables. There is one exception, however: when the share of foreigners among the
unemployed is measured at the level of federal states, and support for helping the un-
employed is measured by the question about financial security, the estimated coefficient
is -0.053 in the fixed-effects model with full individual controls. That is, an increase in
the share of foreigners among the unemployed of one standard deviation (nine percent-
age points) is associated with a decrease in the support for helping the unemployed of
about -0.47. This is quite sizeable compared to other main influences on the support for
redistribution. For instance, a random-effects model estimated on the same sample of
“stayers” shows that the self-employed tend to be less supportive by -0.21 points, whereas
the support tends to be higher by 0.18 points for people who lived in the East in 1989
(the table with these results is not reported here for the sake of brevity).
7.3 Separate models for East and West Germany
Given these East-West differences in the support for the welfare state—already high-
lighted by Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007)— the model has also been estimated
separately by current region and by region in 1989. Unlike in the previous robustness
check, the estimation sample again includes both people who live in the same area in
1997 and 2002, and those people who are observed in two different areas. As in the main
models above, the variance-covariance estimator is robust to heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation, but not to clustering within areas.
Tables 20 and 21 in the appendix report the results when the model is estimated separately
for people who lived in the East in 1989 and for those who lived in the West. Tables
22 and 23 distinguish by current region of residence. To save space, only the results for
the dependent variable “financial security of the unemployed” are reported. These four
tables reinforce the conclusion that was drawn for the main model above, namely that the
regional share of foreigners among the unemployed is not a strong predictor of natives’
support for helping the unemployed. Most point estimates are negative, but all are small
in size and many are not significantly different from zero.
7.4 Influence of other area-level variables
Counties, regional planning units, and federal states that differ in the share of foreigners
among the unemployed will also differ in other respects. So far, these other differences
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were part of the error term.20 However, to the extent that these unobserved area-level
variables are correlated with both the share of foreigners among the unemployed and with
natives’ support for helping the unemployed, the OLS estimates will be biased.
Two of these area-level variables are of special interest. First, Luttmer (2001) shows
that the support for welfare is lower in communities with high rates of welfare recipients.
Luttmer calls this a “negative exposure effect”—the effect that “individuals decrease their
support for welfare as the welfare recipiency rate in their community rises” (Luttmer
2001, 500). Luttmer argues that such “a negative relationship could arise from financial
or psychological costs that respondents attribute to giving welfare to local recipients” (p.
506).
The equivalent in the present article is to study how the unemployment rate in an area
affects the support for helping the unemployed. In all specifications so far I did already
control for individual unemployment status in the current period, but the risk of being
unemployed in the future will depend on regional unemployment rate. As noted, I have
already partly captured this risk by controlling for individuals’ subjective concerns about
their own economic situation and about the economy in general. However, there may
still be a case for including the regional unemployment rate as well, because it will
affect the expected duration of unemployment and the stigma attached to it. As noted
above, the unemployment rate and the share of foreigners among the unemployed are
negatively correlated in Germany. The correlation coefficient is -.84 for federal states,
-.68 for regional planning units, and -.50 for counties. The negative correlation mainly
reflects that areas in East Germany tend to have both high rates of unemployment and
low shares of foreigners in the population and among the unemployed. But even in West
Germany the correlation is negative (except for counties, where the two variables are
basically unrelated, with r = 0.05).
Column 1 of tables 26 - 31 in the appendix show that the regional unemployment rate
tends to be positively associated with natives’ support for helping the unemployed.21
That is, I do not find evidence for the “negative exposure effect” that Luttmer (2001)
finds for the support for welfare spending in the U.S.
The second area-level variable that needs to be discussed is the share of foreigners in the
population, as opposed to their share among the registered unemployed. The problem
20Except in section 7.2, where all time-invariant area characteristics were eliminated in the estimation.
In the present subsection, by contrast, the focus is on the influence of area characteristics that do vary
over time.
21To save space, results are only shown for the dependent variable that asks about the financial security
of the unemployed. The same positive association is found for the other dependent variable that asks
about job creation measures.
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here is that the two variables are highly correlated: the correlation coefficient is .98 for
federal states, .97 for regional planning units, and .93 for counties.
The results that are obtained when the population share of foreigners is nevertheless
added to the model can be found in column 2 of tables 26 - 31 in the appendix. The
results are mixed: in the random-effects models, the coefficient on the population share
of foreigners is negative for counties, statistically insignificant for regional planning units,
and positive for federal states. In the fixed-effects models, the same pattern is found, but
the coefficients are less precisely estimated and are at best marginally significant.
Concerning the coefficient on the share of foreigners among the unemployed, the results
are again mixed. In the random-effects models, the estimate is positive for counties,
insignificant for regional planning units, and negative for federal states. In the fixed-effects
models, the coefficient is significant only for federal states, where it is again negative.
Even for federal states the coefficient suggests that the association is less strong than for
other covariates such as self-employment or income.
8 Conclusion
Based on data from the 1997 and 2002 waves of the German Socio-Economic Panel and
from official statistics, this article has studied whether natives are less supportive of state
help for the unemployed in regions where the share of foreigners among the unemployed
is high. Unlike in previous studies using (repeated) cross-sections, the models were esti-
mated using individual-level panel data, which allows more convincing identification of a
causal effect.
The main result is that there is indeed evidence that German natives’ support for the un-
employed is negatively affected by the regional share of foreigners among the unemployed.
Mean comparisons show that people in areas with a high share of foreigners among the
unemployed do tend to be less supportive of state help for the unemployed. However,
much of this difference is driven by common influences such as income or East German
origin. Once these individual characteristics are controlled for, the share of foreigners
among the unemployed is still negatively associated with natives’ support for the unem-
ployed, but the association is rather weak compared to other variables such as income,
self-employment, or East German origin.
Although not the main focus of this paper, two other results relating to earlier studies
have been obtained. First, I find that East Germans tend to be more supportive of state
help for the unemployed, even controlling for material self-interest. This confirms the
26
results by Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007), who use almost the same data and similar
specifications. By contrast, I did not find evidence for a “negative exposure effect,” the
effect that “individuals decrease their support for welfare as the welfare recipiency rate
in their community rises” (Luttmer 2001, 500). In Germany, the regional unemployment
rate tends to be positively associated with natives’ support for helping the unemployed.
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A.1 Summary statistics
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Figure 1: Responsibility for financial security of the unemployed
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Figure 2: Responsibility for job creation
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Table 2: Regional variables
Level Variable Mean SD Min Max
Unemployment rate 11.9 5.2 0.4 29.5
County Foreigners per 100 residents 8.2 5.6 0.4 26.0
Foreigners / 100 unemployed 13.1 9.7 0.3 44.2
Unemployment rate 12.1 4.9 5.1 25.5
Regional planning unit Foreigners per 100 residents 8.3 4.8 1.3 17.5
Foreigners / 100 unemployed 13.4 8.9 0.5 33.4
Unemployment rate 11.9 4.6 6.8 21.1
Federal state Foreigners per 100 residents 8.0 4.1 1.5 15.2
Foreigners / 100 unemployed 13.1 7.7 1.0 23.9
Note: Own calculations based on Indikatoren und Karten zur Raumentwicklung, published by the Bundesamt fuer
Bauwesen und Raumordnung; 1999 and 2004 editions of the CD-ROM.
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Table 3: Summary statistics
Variable Mean SD Min Max N
State responsible: financial security unemployed 0.67 . 0 1 32750
State responsible for job creation 0.40 . 0 1 32759
Male 0.48 . 0 1 33203
Age 46.09 17.21 17 99 33203
Lived in East in 1989 0.31 . 0 1 31030
Lives in East 0.28 . 0 1 33202
Born abroad 0.07 . 0 1 32496
Foreign nationality 0.00 . 0 0 33203
Household size 2.81 1.27 1 12 33203
Single 0.24 . 0 1 33200
Married 0.61 . 0 1 33200
Married but separated 0.02 . 0 1 33200
Divorced 0.07 . 0 1 33200
Widowed 0.07 . 0 1 33200
Household net income (month) 2739.93 1528.50 480 10428 31318
Working 0.59 . 0 1 33203
Not working, unemployed 0.05 . 0 1 33203
Not working, other reasons 0.36 . 0 1 33203
Civil servant 0.05 . 0 1 33178
Self-employed 0.06 . 0 1 33195
Owns residence 0.52 . 0 1 33203
Worried overall economy 1.68 0.60 1 3 33052
Worried own economic situation 2.11 0.68 1 3 33043
No degree yet 0.03 . 0 1 32627
Dropout, no degree 0.02 . 0 1 32627
Hauptschule 0.38 . 0 1 32627
Realschule 0.31 . 0 1 32627
Abitur 0.23 . 0 1 32627
Other degree 0.04 . 0 1 32627
College degree 0.19 . 0 1 32811
Vocational degree 0.66 . 0 1 32811
Year = 1997 0.34 . 0 1 33203
Year = 2002 0.66 . 0 1 33203
Note: GSOEP 1997 and 2002. Real income is in 2005 euros.
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A.2 Variance decomposition
Table 4: Decomposition of overall variance into variance between and variance within
individuals: whole sample
Sum of squares Percent
Area Total Between Within Within N
County 2466337 2355851 110486 4.48 26437
Regional planning unit 2127199 2093173 34026 1.60 26796
Federal state 1833126 1811295 21831 1.19 31253
Note: Total sum of squares = sum of squared deviations of individual values from overall mean. Between
sum of squares = sum of squared deviations of individual means from overall mean. Within sum of squares
= sum of squared deviations of individual values from individual means.
Table 5: Decomposition of overall variance into variance between and variance within
individuals: only individuals who took part in both waves
Sum of squares Percent
Area Total Between Within Within N
County 1233164 1122678 110486 8.96 12770
Regional planning unit 1072668 1038642 34026 3.17 12999
Federal state 1027096 1005265 21831 2.13 16146
Note: Total sum of squares = sum of squared deviations of individual values from overall mean. Between
sum of squares = sum of squared deviations of individual means from overall mean. Within sum of squares
= sum of squared deviations of individual values from individual means.
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A.3 Cross tabulations
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A.5 Hausman tests
Table 16: Hausman tests using Wald tests in an auxiliary regression
Financial Security Job Creation
County 33.6* 36.4*
( .029) ( .014)
Regional planning unit 31.0 37.7*
( .056) ( .0096)
Federal state 32.6* 43.6*
( .038) ( .0017)
Note: The table reports results from Wald tests of γ = 0 in the auxiliary re-
gression of equation (9) on page 20. In this regression, a panel-robust variance-
covariance estimator is used. The first line in each cell shows the test statistic,
the second line shows the associated p-value. An asterisk denotes statistical
significance at the 5% level.
A.6 Robustness checks
Table 17: Overview of results for the dependent variable ’state responsibility for job cre-
ation’
Bivariate Full controls
RE FE RE FE
County -.01* -.0011 -.0022* -.0017
( .00058) ( .0022) ( .00074) ( .0023)
Regional planning unit -.012* -.0033 -.0022* -.0036
( .00063) ( .0037) ( .0009) ( .0039)
Federal state -.015* -.0038 -.0028* -.0071
( .0007) ( .0047) ( .0012) ( .0049)
Note: Asymptotic standard errors—robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation—are
shown in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
48
Table 18: Overview of results for the dependent variable ’state responsibility for the fi-
nancial security for the unemployed’ — Only people who are observed in the
same area in both 1997 and 2002.
Bivariate Full controls
RE FE RE FE
County -.0085* -.0018 -.0016 -.0023
( .0015) ( .0057) ( .0018) ( .0052)
Regional planning unit -.012* -.015 -.003 -.016
( .0018) ( .02) ( .0021) ( .02)
Federal state -.016* -.056* -.0054* -.053*
( .002) ( .025) ( .0018) ( .023)
Note: Asymptotic standard errors—robust to heteroskedasticity and to
both serial correlation and correlation at the area-level—are shown in
parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
Table 19: Overview of results for the dependent variable ’state responsibility for job cre-
ation’ — Only people who are observed in the same area in both 1997 and
2002.
Bivariate Full controls
RE FE RE FE
County -.01* -.0043* -.003 -.0044*
( .0015) ( .0019) ( .0017) ( .0021)
Regional planning unit -.012* -.011 -.0015 -.021
( .0019) ( .018) ( .0023) ( .021)
Federal state -.016* -.011 -.0044 -.025
( .0014) ( .018) ( .0037) ( .021)
Note: Asymptotic standard errors—robust to heteroskedasticity and to
both serial correlation and correlation at the area-level—are shown in
parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical significance at the 5% level.
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Table 20: Overview of results for the dependent variable ’state responsibility for the finan-
cial security for the unemployed.’ — Only people who lived in East Germany
in 1989.
Bivariate Full controls
RE FE RE FE
County -.0038* -.0036 -.0024 -.0037
( .0013) ( .0027) ( .0013) ( .0028)
Regional planning unit -.0022 -.0064 .0015 -.0036
( .0016) ( .0055) ( .0017) ( .0057)
Federal state -.005* -.011 -.00042 -.00012
( .0016) ( .0057) ( .0017) ( .0067)
Note: Asymptotic standard errors—robust to heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation—are shown in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical
significance at the 5% level.
Table 21: Overview of results for the dependent variable ’state responsibility for the finan-
cial security for the unemployed.’ — Only people who lived in West Germany
in 1989.
Bivariate Full controls
RE FE RE FE
County -.0021* -.0059 -.0013 -.0057
( .00078) ( .0039) ( .00083) ( .0042)
Regional planning unit -.0036* -.0099 -.0023* -.01
( .00096) ( .0059) ( .001) ( .0064)
Federal state -.0021 -.0077 -.0018 -.0046
( .0015) ( .0092) ( .0015) ( .01)
Note: Asymptotic standard errors—robust to heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation—are shown in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical signif-
icance at the 5% level.
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Table 22: Overview of results for the dependent variable ’state responsibility for the fi-
nancial security for the unemployed.’ — Only people who currently live in East
Germany.
Bivariate Full controls
RE FE RE FE
County -.0014 -.0024 -.0006 -.0027
( .0014) ( .0028) ( .0015) ( .0028)
Regional planning unit .0017 -.0082 .006* -.0048
( .002) ( .0071) ( .0021) ( .0073)
Federal state .0017 -.027* .007* -.011
( .0023) ( .013) ( .0025) ( .016)
Note: Asymptotic standard errors—robust to heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation—are shown in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical
significance at the 5% level.
Table 23: Overview of results for the dependent variable ’state responsibility for the fi-
nancial security for the unemployed.’ — Only people who currently live in West
Germany.
Bivariate Full controls
RE FE RE FE
County -.0023* -.0054 -.0012 -.0057
( .00074) ( .0038) ( .00082) ( .0042)
Regional planning unit -.0037* -.0069 -.0019 -.0063
( .00091) ( .0056) ( .00099) ( .0059)
Federal state -.0027 -.00042 -.0011 .00035
( .0015) ( .012) ( .0016) ( .013)
Note: Asymptotic standard errors—robust to heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation—are shown in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical signif-
icance at the 5% level.
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Table 24: Overview of results for the dependent variable ’state responsibility for the fi-
nancial security for the unemployed’
Aggregate Area dummies
RE FE RE FE
County -.00077 -.0034 -.00077 -.0034
( .00072) ( .003) ( .00072) ( .003)
Regional planning unit .000013 -.0028 .000013 -.0028
( .00092) ( .0047) ( .00092) ( .0047)
Federal state -.00022 -.0077 -.00022 -.0077
( .0013) ( .0064) ( .0013) ( .0064)
Note: Asymptotic standard errors—robust to heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation—are shown in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical signif-
icance at the 5% level.
Table 25: Overview of results for the dependent variable ’state responsibility for job cre-
ation’
Aggregate Area dummies
RE FE RE FE
County -.0013 .0038 -.0013 .0038
( .00076) ( .003) ( .00076) ( .003)
Regional planning unit -.0014 -.0007 -.0014 -.0007
( .00096) ( .0044) ( .00096) ( .0044)
Federal state -.0032* -.01 -.0032* -.01
( .0014) ( .0059) ( .0014) ( .0059)
Note: Asymptotic standard errors—robust to heteroskedasticity and serial
correlation—are shown in parentheses. An asterisk denotes statistical signif-
icance at the 5% level.
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